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REPLY

Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified
Immunity?
William Baude*
Has qualified immunity finally found its roots? Scott Keller’s Qualified and
Absolute Immunity at Common Law shows the breadth and complexity of
nineteenth century case law dealing with official immunities.1 But its most
important claim, for today’s purposes, is the claim to find a historical basis for a
doctrine of qualified immunity: an immunity from suit given to all
government officials (including, but not only, the police) whenever they are
sued for violating the Constitution. According to Keller, “the common law
definitively accorded at least qualified immunity to all executive officers’
discretionary duties” in 1871, when Congress passed the civil rights statute
now codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983.2 This would be very important if it were true.
But it is not.
Let us assume that this body of nineteenth-century common law should be
translated to the scope of remedies under a statutory action for violations of
the Constitution.3 Even so, the common law did not recognize the doctrine of
qualified immunity. It recognized a doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, which
shielded certain acts from liability for good faith mistakes. Keller does
acknowledge that this nineteenth century doctrine has important differences
from today’s doctrine.4 But the differences run deeper than you would know
from Keller’s account.
* Professor of Law and Director, Constitutional Law Institute, University of Chicago Law

School. Special thanks to Nathan Tschepik, who provided peerless research assistance.
Thanks as well to Jud Campbell, Katherine Mims Crocker, Orin Kerr, Robert Leider, Jim
Pfander, and Richard Re for helpful suggestions, and to the SNR Denton Fund and Stuart
C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for research support.
1. Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337
(2021).
2. Id. at 1368.
3. But see James Pfander, Zones of Discretion at Common Law, 116 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
148, 164-169 (2021).
4. Keller, supra note 1, at 1378-1389.
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A closer examination of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity shows just
how distant it was from the modern doctrine of qualified immunity. It
protected quasi-judicial acts like election administration and tax assessment,
not ordinary law enforcement decisions.5 It allowed for harsh liability for
officers who exceeded their authority.6 And the defense was not an immunity
from suit.7 Thus, today’s doctrine of qualified immunity owes more to modern
judicial invention than it does to the common law.
I.

Quasi-Judicial

The nineteenth-century good faith defense did not apply to all, or even
most, official acts. Rather, it applied only to “quasi-judicial” acts. As a cousin of
the doctrine of judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity applied to “powers
very nearly akin to those of judges in the courts,”8 the exercise of a “discretion
in its nature judicial.”9 Quasi-judicial acts received the kind of defense Keller
describes.10 An act undertaken without such quasi-judicial discretion still faced
liability under the ordinary positive law.11 This makes the doctrine very
different from modern qualified immunity, which generally applies “across the
board” regardless of “the precise nature of various officials’ duties.”12
To be sure, the boundaries of quasi-judicial immunity were somewhat
shaggy during this period, and sometimes extended to acts that do not
immediately strike us as judicial today. Quasi-judicial acts included, for
example, a defective certification of a notary, “in its nature a judicial act”;13 the
“judicial powers” of the surveyor general of the United States;14 the oversight
of an election “in a judicial capacity”;15 the decision that a railroad had
5. See Part I.
6. See Part II.
7. See Part III.
8. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 636
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

(1890).
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW § 786 (1889).
Infra notes 13-18.
Infra notes 19-25.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642-643 (1987) (citation omitted); see also Hoggard
v. Rhodes, 141 S.Ct. 2421 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing
(and criticizing) “one-size-fits-all” approach to qualified immunity).
Henderson v. Smith, 26 W. Va. 829, 837 (1885).
Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 38 (1854).
State v. McDonald, 4 Del. 555, 556 (Del. O. & T. 1845); see also Miller v. Rucker, 64 Ky.
135, 136 (1866) (“These officers, so appointed for the purposes of holding elections and
determining the rights of the elector to exercise the elective franchise, are, to all
intents, for such purposes, judicial...”).
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completed its construction contract, made by trustees of a township, whose
“duty in this respect is of a judicial character”;16 the “quasi judicial” decisions of
the California board of Pilot Commissioners;17 or allowing convicts to work
unsupervised outside a prison.18
On the other hand, quasi-judicial immunity was denied, and ordinary law
was applied, to many other officers: A sheriff who improperly sold levied
property;19 a tax assessor whose incorrect return led to a foreclosure;20 county
commissioners who failed to repair a bridge;21 other county commissioners
who failed to levy a tax necessary to pay their bonds;22 a school superintendent
whose licensing decisions were “of a merely administrative character”;23 a clerk
who failed to docket a suit;24 and even a justice of the peace who had not “filed
the appeal papers according to law.”25
What unified the concept of quasi-judicial immunity was the idea that the
act had been specially committed to the officer’s own judgment, with
immunity from the judgments of others. That is, the officer had been given the
power to make his own mistakes. As Bishop’s treatise put it, a quasi-judicial act
was one where the officer was empowered to follow “the dictates of his own
judgment,” so that “whether the result is correct or not, he has exactly
discharged his duty.”26 And Thomas M. Cooley wrote: “Judicial action implies
not merely a question, but a question referred for solution to the judgment or
discretion of the officer himself.”27
This explains the kinship between quasi-judicial immunity and judicial
immunity. Judicial power was fundamentally the power to make binding legal
determinations—determinations that were no less binding even if they were
wrong.28 Quasi-judicial acts were those where an officer had been given a
16. Muscatine W. R. Co. v. Horton, 38 Iowa 33, 47 (1873).
17. Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 95 (1856).
18. See Schoettgen v. Wilson, 48 Mo. 253, 257 (1871). Two of the defendants were

inspectors of the penitentiary, and one was the warden.
19. See Sawyer v. Wilson, 61 Me. 529, 532 (1873) (“The justification, therefore, pleaded by
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

the officer fails, and he must be regarded as a trespasser in selling the property.”).
Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 346, 5 N.W. 403, 405 (1880).
Baltimore Cnty. Comm’rs v. Baker, 44 Md. 1, 8 (1876).
St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Leland, 90 Mo. 177, 2 S.W. 431, 432 (1886).
Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N.E. 197, 199 (1886).
Brown v. Lester, 21 Miss. 392, 393 (1850).
Peters v. Land, 5 Blackf. 12, 12 (Ind. 1838).
BISHOP, supra note 9, § 787.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 396 (1879).
William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1808-11, 1831 (2008); cf. John
Harrison, Power, Duty, and Facial Invalidity, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501, 523 (2013)
(“Judicial power is the power to be wrong.”).
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similar kind of power—to make determinations that were authoritative even if
they were wrong.29
Translating this doctrine of quasi-judicial power to modern case law
would be tricky given how much has changed. But it was much narrower in
both theory and in practice than today’s qualified immunity. So while Keller
suggests that quasi-judicial acts are “what we consider today essentially as
discretionary policy decisions or judgments requiring the application of facts
to law,”30 this formulation is too broad.
For instance, in the 1868 case of McCord v. High, a road supervisor lacked
immunity despite having substantial discretion:
It must be borne in mind that, the fact of an officer being clothed with discretion
in the discharge of a duty as to the manner of its performance, or as to the control
of circumstances and attendant acts necessarily arising in the discharge of such
duty, will not give to it a judicial character. It is impossible to conceive of any
ministerial duty to be performed by an officer that may not be, that is not,
accompanied by circumstances which require the exercise of judgment and
discretion.31

This basic point—that discretion was not necessarily quasi-judicial—
reappears throughout the treatises and cases.32
This gap between nineteenth-century quasi-judicial immunity and
modern qualified immunity is especially apparent in the law enforcement
context. Law enforcement activities make up the bulk of modern qualified
immunity cases, but law enforcement activities did not receive quasi-judicial
immunity in the nineteenth century.
Some courts expressly labeled law enforcement a “ministerial” act—the
antipode of a quasi-judicial one.33 Similarly, in McCord, the court had also
argued by analogy to “a sheriff, whose duties are of a purely ministerial
character.”34 In executing a writ, said the court, “he exercises discretion and
29. BISHOP, supra note 9, § 787; see also MECHEM, supra note 8, § 638 (noting the “judicial . . .

nature” or “character” of quasi-judicial powers); MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, A TREATISE
LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFICERS AND SURETIES IN OFFICIAL BONDS § 533
(Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1892) (same).
Keller, supra note 1, at 1346.
McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336, 343–44 (1868).
See, e.g., MECHEM, supra note 8, § 643; THROOP, supra note 29, § 538; Brock v. Hopkins, 5
Neb. 231, 235 (1876) (rejecting quasi-judicial immunity even though it was “true that in
the performance of his duty . . . the clerk is required to exercise his judgment to a
certain extent”); see also infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 71 (1820) (describing a justice of the peace
as a “judicial officer” but a constable as a “ministerial officer” in a suit against both);
Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341, 342 (1875) (describing the defendants in a false arrest suit
as “ministerial officers”).
McCord, 24 Iowa at 344.
ON THE

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.
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judgment, and is liable for errors and mistakes that may result in loss to others,
though they were the result of the deliberate exercise, in good faith, of such
discretion and judgment.”35
Other courts that did not use the label nonetheless demonstrated that law
enforcement activities were not quasi-judicial and were subject to ordinary
law: A sheriff who lawfully entered property to seize one man’s sheep was held
liable for seizing another man’s sheep when they had become intermixed.36 So
too a deputy sheriff who had mistakenly seized a man’s property that the man
had lent for use in his brother-in-law’s tavern.37 And so too a sheriff who
mistakenly seized property from the wrong one of two corporations with
identical names.38 There was even liability for an appointed fugitive recovery
agent who may have arrested the right person, but under a warrant that had the
wrong name.39
And in an especially close analogue to modern cases, the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a jury verdict for wrongful arrest against a Chicago police
officer.40 The officer objected that there was no evidence of malice or
unreasonableness.41 The court answered:
This is sufficiently answered by reference to the form of the action. The suit is
not for malicious prosecution, but for assault and battery, and false
imprisonment. If the plaintiff was assaulted and beaten, or imprisoned, by the
defendant, without authority of law, it can not be doubted that he is entitled to
recover, whatever may have been the defendant’s motives.42

The bottom line is this: Law enforcement officers did not receive quasi-judicial
immunity for their mistakes. The closest examples Keller can point to for law

35. Id.
36. Kingsbury v. Pond, 3 N.H. 511, 513 (1826) (“[T]he officer was bound at his peril to see

37.
38.

39.

40.
41.
42.

that he took no sheep belonging to the plaintiff; and as he did take the plaintiff ’s sheep,
it was an abuse of his process, which made him a trespasser ab initio, and his entry
unlawful.”).
Walcot v. Pomeroy, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 121, 129-30 (1824).
President of Hallowell & Augusta Bank, Inc. v. Howard, 14 Mass. 181, 183 (1817) (“The
ignorance of the officer does not excuse him; for in such a case he is not bound to serve
the precept upon either, without the express direction of the creditor, and an
indemnifying engagement from him.”).
Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97, 137 (1853); cf. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat.
302, 302 (repealed 1864) (requiring interstate fugitives “to be delivered” to “the agent of
such [executive] authority appointed to receive the fugitive”).
Shanley v. Wells, 71 Ill. 78, 79 (1873).
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81; see also BISHOP, supra note 9, § 212 (citation omitted) (“In false imprisonment
proper, as distinguished from malicious prosecution, malice is not required.”).
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enforcement immunities fall into two categories: reliance on others, and nonimmunity cases.43
First, there is a small set of contested cases where law enforcement acts
received immunity: where officers relied on a defective warrant that seemed
lawful on its face44 or a statute subsequently held unconstitutional.45 These are
both cases where officers were relying on the mistaken constitutional analysis
of other officials. These are potentially sympathetic scenarios, and it might well
be good policy to provide immunity when an officer relies in good faith on
somebody else’s mistake.46 But even in these scenarios, the courts were quite
split. For instance, there were at least as many courts finding that an
unconstitutional statute is void and therefore can provide no immunity.47
Thus, even this more limited immunity was not well established in 1871.
Second, the other set of cases cited by Keller are a category error. The
seemingly strongest of these is Mayo v. Sample,48 but Mayo is not a law
enforcement immunity case. It is not an immunity case because it was an action
for slander against the mayor, in which the mayor invoked a well-established
privilege for comment by public officials; this privilege was part of the law of
slander, not a freestanding immunity.49 And for what it is worth, it is barely a
law enforcement case, for the mayor’s connection to law enforcement was
simply that he was “by virtue of said office, the head of the police department
of the city of Keokuk.”50
43. Keller, supra note 1, at 1348-49, 1353-55, 1372 n.211.
44. See Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170, 172 (N.Y. 1830); Watson v. Watson, 9 Conn.
45.

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.

140, 146 (1832); Norcross v. Nunan, 61 Cal. 640, 642 (1882).
Henke v. McCord, 7 N.W. 623, 625-26 (Iowa 1880) (warrant issued pursuant to
unconstitutional statute); Brooks v. Mangan, 49 N.W. 633, 634 (Mich. 1891) (same); see
also State v. McNally, 34 Me. 210, 221 (1852) (“It was no part of the officer’s duty to
examine into and decide upon the constitutionality or construction of the statute
which authorized his warrant.”).
Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984), and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
342 (1987), recognizing good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule in these contexts.
See Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 71 (1820); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1
Gray) 1, 44-46 (1854); Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307, 316 (1871); Campbell v. Sherman, 35
Wis. 103, 110 (1874); Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341, 342 (1875); Gross v. Rice, 71 Me. 241,
252 (1880). The case of the facially valid warrant issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction may have been more clearly established. See supra note 45. It is not clear
that the arresting officer has even committed a legal wrong in such a case.
Mayo v. Sample, 18 Iowa 306 (1865).
See, e.g., Libel—Privileged Communication, 17 HARV. L. REV. 60-61 (1903) (describing this
rule and citing Mayo); Smith v. Howard, 28 Iowa 51, 57 (1869) (same); Patrick J.
McNulty, The Law of Defamation: A Primer for the Iowa Practitioner, 44 DRAKE L. REV.
639, 658 (1996) (describing the same rule under Iowa’s modern law of defamation).
Mayo, 18 Iowa at 307 n.1 (quoting defendant’s plea, which was “found . . . true in point
of fact,” id. at 310).
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The other cases are even further afield. One set of them are cases about the
law of arrest holding that public officials can arrest on the basis of probable
cause, which is now part of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.51
Another set are cases saying that law enforcement officers could not be sued
for duties owed to the general public, only for duties owed to individuals.52
This too is irrelevant to qualified immunity. The duties for which modern
constitutional suits are brought, like the duty not to unreasonably search and
seize,53 and not to deprive people of liberty without due process of law,54 are
owed to individuals. Today one indeed cannot sue an officer for a duty owed to
the general public, but this is for other reasons55 which have nothing to do
with immunity.
More fundamentally, Keller’s invocation of these cases betrays his general
conflation of “discretion” with what he calls “the broader concept of quasijudicial immunity.”56 But, to repeat, quasi-judicial immunity was not simply a
result of legal discretion. An officer could have discretion without immunity.
One of the treatises Keller relies on is Throop’s, which has a section titled
“When an act, requiring an exercise of judgment or discretion, may still be
ministerial.”57 It explains: an “act is not necessarily taken out of the class styled
ministerial, because the officer performing it is required to judge, whether the
contingency has occurred, in which he is empowered or bound to act . . . .”58
This is exactly how we would describe a nineteenth-century officer’s factual
determination that there were reasonable grounds to make an arrest.59
51. For examples, see Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 283-84 (1850); Winkler v. State,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

32 Ark. 539, 548 (1877); and O’Connor v. Bucklin, 59 N.H. 589, 591 (1879), all cited in
Keller, supra n. 1, at 1372 n.211. For contemporary doctrine, see United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (“The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the
ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest . . . for a felony
not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”).
Keller, supra note 1, at 1348-49.
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (no duty);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (no standing).
Keller, supra note 1, at 1372 n. 211.
THROOP, supra note 29, § 538; see also Keller, supra note 1, at 1337 et seq. (noting reliance
on Throop).
THROOP, supra note 29, § 538.
By contrast, under modern doctrine, an officer who makes a mistake about probable
cause can get qualified immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)
(“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some
cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have
indicated that in such cases those officials —like other officials who act in ways they
reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held personally liable.”).
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There is much to be said about quasi-judicial immunity, but it was not
today’s qualified immunity. That is why there are no cases cited by Keller or
the treatises where an illegal act of law enforcement received immunity for the
official’s own mistake.
II. Scope of Discretion
Even as to quasi-judicial acts, immunity was further limited. It applied
only to cases within the jurisdiction of the officer.60 Keller notes this
important limitation, but minimizes it by arguing that “officers exercising
discretionary duties lacked immunity under this exception only when there
was a clear absence—not just when they acted in excess—of authority.”61 Even so
it is worth emphasizing how harshly it applied in practice, so that the phrase
“clear absence” does not mislead us. Consider, for instance, the many cases
about tax assessors: They usually received immunity even when they illegally
taxed somebody,62 yet they would still be held strictly liable for taxing in the
wrong area,63 even when there was a good faith dispute about which town a
taxpayer resided in.64
Liability for jurisdictional error was strict even if the error involved a
tricky question of law. For instance, in the 1877 Supreme Court case of Bates v.
Clark, two customs collectors seized liquor in what they thought to be Indian
Country.65 But they were wrong, so they had no good faith defense. It was true,
as the Court explained sympathetically, that the definition of Indian Country
was quite confusing as a legal matter, so the officials may well have acted
reasonably, and in good faith.66 But they were “utterly without any authority
in the premises; and their honest belief that they had is no defence [sic] in their
case more than in any other.”67

60. Keller, supra note 1, at 1350-53.
61. Id.
62. Vail v. Owen, 19 Barb. Ch. 22, 29 (N.Y. Ch. 1854); Gould v. Hammond, 10 F. Cas. 874, 875

63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1857); Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N.Y. 238, 242 (1866); McDaniel v. Tebbetts,
60 N.H. 497, 497 (1881); COOLEY, supra note 27, at 411; THROOP, supra note 29, §541; but
see Suydam v. Keys, 13 Johns. 444, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Gage v. Currier, 21 Mass.
399, 421 (1826).
Freeman v. Kenney, 32 Mass. 44, 46-47 (1833) (noting liability but holding plaintiff
should have sued in trespass rather than case); Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N.Y. 316, 321
(1857); THROOP, supra note 29, §541.
Dorn v. Backer, 61 N.Y. 261, 263 (1874).
Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 204-05 (1877).
Id. at 209.
Id.
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Once again, it is not clear how to translate this concept of jurisdiction or
authority to modern-day officers. But one natural possibility is to say that an
official who violates the Constitution acts without authority. Sina Kian has
argued that the common law recognized a fundamental “distinction between
unauthorized acts and discretionary acts,”68 consistent with Keller. But
according to Kian, the result of this distinction was “strict liability for acting
outside of the authority enumerated by the Constitution.”69 Or to quote Jim
Pfander: “The Constitution thus set a limit to lawful official action, and
officials who exceeded constitutional limits (however well-intentioned) were
thought to enjoy no residual discretion within which to act lawfully or, in
Keller’s terms, no immunity from suit.”70
And indeed, some courts did describe the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute as an act without jurisdiction. As the Kentucky
Supreme Court put it when an African-American man was unconstitutionally
denied the right to self-defense:
It is very true, that a judicial officer can not be punished for errors in judgment,
on subjects within the scope of his authority, and over which he has jurisdiction.
But this does not hold good when he attempts to exercise authority when he has
none, and assumes jurisdiction without any power. . . . If this doctrine be correct,
in the case of an illegal warrant, how much more so ought it to be in a case where
the constitution is violated? It is an instrument that every officer of government
is bound to know and preserve, at his peril, whether his office be judicial or
ministerial . . . .71

Though I have mostly left Keller’s discussion of absolute immunity to the
side, it is worth noting that this same reasoning shows why it is hard to infer
(as Keller does)72 from Spalding v. Vilas73 an absolute immunity for highranking executive officials from constitutional claims. In holding that the
postmaster general could not be sued for libel, the Court first spent several
68. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed,

and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 154 (2012).
69. Id. at 155.
70. Pfander, supra note 3, at 167 (discussing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
71. Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 76 (1820). See also, e.g., Kelly v. Bemis, 70 Mass. 83, 84 (1855)

(“Under a government of limited and defined powers, where, by the provisions of the
organic law, the rights and duties of the several departments of the government are
carefully distributed and restricted, if any one of them exceeds the limits of its
constitutional power, it acts wholly without authority itself, and can confer no
authority upon others. The defendant could derive no power or jurisdiction from a
void statute. He therefore acted without any jurisdiction; and, upon familiar and well
settled principles, is liable in this action.”).
72. Keller, supra note 1, at 1379-80.
73. Spalding v Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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pages painstakingly establishing that his action “was not unauthorized by law,
nor beyond the scope of his official duties.”74 If the postmaster’s actions had
violated a legal constraint imposed by the Constitution, it would have been
impossible to say that. Indeed, the Court specifically upheld the
constitutionality of the underlying statute first.75
III. Immunity
Finally, even where it did apply, the common law defense was one of good
faith. Even as to quasi-judicial acts within the bounds of jurisdiction, this is not
the same thing as the modern doctrine of qualified immunity. Again, Keller
acknowledges this,76 but focusing on it lets us see for a third time how far
modern qualified immunity is from common law quasi-judicial immunity.
First, the modern doctrine of qualified immunity was deliberately
engineered to go beyond a traditional good faith defense. In Harlow, the Court
self-consciously enacted “an adjustment of the ‘good faith’ standard” and instead
crafted a test that turned on “objective reasonableness . . . as measured by
reference to clearly established law.”77 The fruits of this choice are apparent in
more recent qualified immunity cases, where for instance an officer has been
given immunity even though he was inexperienced and ignored the
instructions of his supervisor.78
Second, this leads to an important implication that Keller does not
mention: Justifying qualified immunity as a good faith defense would require
the abandonment of qualified immunity’s distinctive procedural features. Under
modern Supreme Court doctrine, the qualified immunity defense can produce
two separate interlocutory appeals for the defendant, and also stop all
discovery while the motion to dismiss is being resolved (and appealed).79
These special privileges are justified under the theory that qualified
immunity is a special form of an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability.”80 Yet, most nineteenth century official liability cases were on
74. Id. at 489-93.
75. Id. at 490 (“No one will question the power of congress to enact legislation that would

effect such an object.”).
76. Keller, supra note 1, at 1390-96.
77. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-15, 818 (1982); see also Keller, supra note 1, at

1393-96 (criticizing Harlow).
78. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 307 (2015). Keller does argue that Harlow itself could

have been properly decided under a nineteenth century presumption of good faith.
Keller, supra note 1, at 1396-99. But the evidence in Mullenix could have rebutted such a
presumption.
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appeal from a final judgment. Even where the reviewing court found an
immunity from liability to exist, no court held it to be an immunity from suit.
So even if Keller is right about how to ground qualified immunity, these
privileges would lack any foundation.
Conclusion
For the most part, the task of courts is to apply the law without indulging
additional sympathies for powerful persons. Keller is right that the common
law itself recognized some official immunities from the law, including for
certain officials acting in good faith. But one should not mistake that exception
for the modern doctrine of qualified immunity.
The quasi-judicial immunity known to the common law protected certain
acts of tax assessors, election judges, and the like acting within their
jurisdiction. Today’s qualified immunity protects all officials, especially
including the police, who violate any constitutional limit. What brought us
from there to here was judicial creativity, not any reasonable interpretation of
the law laid down in 1871.
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